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Abstract
We construct a monetary economy with heterogeneity in discounting and consumption risk. Agents
can insure against this risk with money and nominal government bonds, but all trades must be mon-
etary. We demonstrate that a deflationary policy à la Friedman cannot sustain the constrained-
efficient allocation as no-arbitrage imposes too stringent a bound on the return money can pay.
The constrained-efficient allocation can be sustained when bonds have positive yields and, under
certain conditions, only if they are illiquid. Illiquidity, meaning that bonds cannot be transformed
into consumption as easily as cash, is necessary to eliminate arbitrage opportunities due to dis-
parities in shadow interest rates.
Keywords: Money, Heterogeneity, Friedman Rule, Illiquidity
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1 Introduction
A considerable segment of theoretical monetary literature underscores the social desir-
ability of setting nominal interest rates to zero, a policy known as the Friedman rule.
The basic idea is that if impatient agents must do business with cash, then allocative
efficiency is achieved by simply eliminating the opportunity cost of saving with money. In
fact, zero-interest-rate policies are unusual, and in reality agents largely save with illiquid
assets that are sold for cash as consumption needs arise. Among these assets there are
highly illiquid government securities such as the U.S. Savings Bonds, of which about $200
billion were held in 2005.2
Our study is motivated by the desire to reconcile these observations. In particular,
we focus on two issues. If agents must do business with cash, should interest rates be set
to zero, and if not, what is the reason? And if interest rates should indeed be set above
zero, are there reasons for the government to issue illiquid securities? Of course, to study
these questions we need a theoretical framework where money has an explicit role. This
in turn implies frictions must be introduced, thus generating market incompleteness. For
this reason, we present a physical environment in the tradition of Townsend [21], where
money facilitates spot exchange on spatially separated markets that preclude borrowing
and lending. Specifically, random consumption needs motivate trade but the process of
market interactions is subject to frictions. As a first fundamental friction, a meeting
process is imposed that effectively renders trade partners complete strangers and severs
any durable links among them, as in [2]. A second basic friction concerns commitment and
enforcement limitations. Essentially, agents’ actions must be compatible with individual
incentives. Thus, trade must be quid pro quo and a sudden consumption shock generates
an immediate need for cash.
Because idiosyncratic trading shocks can lead to complicated distributions of money
balances (as in [7]), we draw from the preference and sequential market formulation pro-
posed by Lagos and Wright in [13] to achieve degeneracy in asset holdings. However, two
basic features set our model apart from such a monetary framework. First, agents need
not rely exclusively on cash to insure against consumption shocks. They can also acquire
government nominal bonds that cannot be directly exchanged for goods but can be liq-
uidated for cash if need be. Second, the model accounts for the possibility of a natural
2The figures are from the U.S. Treasury Department. The illiquidity of U.S. Savings Bonds is striking.
They are non-marketable registered securities, i.e., they are owned exclusively by the person(s) named
on them, ownership is non-transferable, they cannot be used as collateral, there are purchase ceilings and
minimum holding times, and there is a penalty for early redemption.
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form of heterogeneity, as agents are assumed to differ in their rate of time preference and
in their exposure to consumption risk.
We compare stationary monetary allocations in competitive equilibrium to the constrained-
efficient allocation. The latter is stationary and corresponds to the selection of a planner
bound by the physical and informational limitations that define the economy. Two results
emerge.
First, if bonds pay no interest (equivalently, if money is the only asset available) the
constrained-efficient allocation is unattainable. The reason is that when nominal interest
rates are set to zero, agents save with cash. Equilibrium deflation is bounded by the
lowest discount rate because, as in [4], giving cash a return exceeding the lowest shadow
interest rate generates arbitrage opportunities. Hence, impatient agents under-save with
cash, which impairs trading efficiency. Yet, because money in our model is essential to
execute trades, everyone holds some cash in equilibrium, unlike [4] where the most patient
agents hold the entire stock of assets (capital).
This first result complements a theoretical monetary literature that finds zero nominal
interest rates are generally optimal unless factors such as income shocks, as in [1], redis-
tributive issues, as in [5] or [10], distortionary taxes, as in [15] or trading externalities, as
in [17] are taken into account. Our work points out that shadow interest rates dispari-
ties are sufficient to blunt the effectiveness of a zero-interest-rate policy. Since existence
of such disparities is empirically well established (e.g., see [16]) our result suggests yet
one more reason why allocative efficiency cannot be achieved by simply eliminating the
opportunity cost of holding cash.
Second, we demonstrate that positive nominal interest rates can sustain the constrained-
efficient allocation under certain conditions, but only if the government issues bonds that
are sufficiently illiquid, i.e. bonds that cannot be turned into consumption as easily as
cash. This friction takes the form of a proportional fee for early redemption. If the gov-
ernment prices bonds correctly, agents fully insure against consumption shocks by holding
bonds that are sold for cash once consumption needs arise. In short, we need a friction
(illiquidity) to cure an inefficiency.
When is illiquidity a necessary friction? In our model this occurs when the most
patient agents are also those who trade more frequently. Illiquidity acts as a tax that
lowers the bonds’ expected return according to the anticipated incidence of consumption
shocks. Thus, illiquidity affects the bonds’ expected return unequally across agent types.
By selecting bond yield and illiquidity appropriately, the policy maker can manipulate the
expected rates of return to eliminate arbitrage opportunities while allowing every agent
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to perfectly insure against consumption risk.
This second result complements recent theoretical research that rationalizes the social
desirability of illiquid securities as tools to overcome social or individual commitment
limitations. In the non-monetary economy described in [14] agents display dynamically
inconsistent preferences and so illiquid assets help agents to beneficially constrain their
own future choices. In the monetary economy laid out in [12], instead, agents value
initial consumption differently but cannot commit to a redistributive plan. Illiquid bonds
overcome this limitation by forcing their owners to postpone consumption. Finally, the
study in [18] takes a different angle and characterizes illiquidity of bonds as an endogenous
outcome linked to government restrictions on market trades. In our work bonds are
not commitment tools that force agents to postpone consumption. Instead, they are
assets designed to provide optimum consumption insurance when disparities in discounting
and consumption risk lead to self-insurance problems that cannot be mended by simply
eliminating the opportunity cost of holding cash.
2 The model
We describe a spatially separated economy in which money has an explicit medium of
exchange function and there is no role for private credit. The model builds on [2], [11],
[13] and [21]. Time is discrete, starts with date 1 and the horizon is infinite. There is a
populationX = N of heterogeneous infinitely-lived agents who want to consume perishable
goods and discount only even to odd dates. Thus, as in [13], we work with trading cycles
indexed by t = 1, 2, ... each including an odd and an even date. As in [21] there are
infinitely many spatially separated trading groups, each of which defines a competitive
market. On each date, every market includes infinitely many anonymous agents who have
never met before. Thus, in each trading cycle each agent visits two anonymous markets,
denoted ‘one’ in the odd date and ‘two’ in the even.
2.1 Trading groups
Trading groups are formed by a matching process that repeatedly partitions the popu-
lation into disjoint sets of agents, as formalized in [2] and [3]. On each date there is a
correspondence μ : X @ X that creates a partition X = ws∈SXs, with S an index set.
Here μ(x) = Xs ⊂ X identifies the trading group of agent x ∈ Xs, with Xs ∩Xs = ∅ for
s 9= s. Since X = N, it is possible to form infinitely many groups each with countably
many agents and an identical proportion of agents types. The matching process can then
be defined as an infinite deterministic sequence (μ1,μ2, . . .), where the set μτ (x) denotes
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the trading group or market to which agent x belongs on date τ = 1, 2, ....
Frictions exist that rule out the possibility of private credit, as in [21]. Precisely, agents
can trade only within their group (spatial separation) and can neither communicate nor
observe events in other groups (limited communication). In addition, agents ignore the
partition of the population and know neither identity, nor type, nor trading history of
others (anonymity). Finally, the matching process is such that agents neither meet the
same partners again nor meet agents with whom they have direct or indirect partners
in common. Equivalently, markets are formed by ‘complete strangers.’ This is a central
feature in several models of money, which we formalize following [11].
Denote by Gτ (x) the set of all direct and indirect partners of agent x up to date τ . It
contains all of x’s past and current partners, the past partners of x’s current partners, the
partners that x’s partners in τ−1 met prior to that date, and so on. If we let G0(x) = {x}
then for τ = 1, 2, . . . define recursively
Gτ (x) = Gτ−1(x) ∪ [∪y∈μτ (x)Gτ−1(y)].
Traders are complete strangers when (μ1,μ2, . . .) is such that for all τ and all y ∈ μτ (x) :
Gτ−1(x)∩Gτ−1(y) = ∅. (1)
A technique to construct trading groups satisfying (1) is analyzed in [2] and [3].3
2.2 Preferences and technologies
Dates differ in terms of agents’ preferences and economic activities, as in [13]. Odd dates
are characterized by idiosyncratic trading risk as an arbitrary agent either works but does
not wish to consume, or consumes but cannot work, or is idle, i.e., he neither wishes to
consume nor is able to work. Everyone can work and consume on even dates.
Agents are heterogeneous. We assume two types of agents denoted by j = H,L in
proportion ρ and 1− ρ. These agents differ in two dimensions. First, the discount factors
βj satisfy 0 < βL < βH < 1, so we refer to agents L as impatient and agents H as
patient. Second, agents draw different i.i.d. trading shocks at the start of each odd date.
Specifically, an agent of type j is idle with probability 1 − αj , where 0 < αL < αH ≤ 1.
3The procedure consists of three steps. Start by partitioning the population into countably many sets
of identical cardinality. Based on this partition, construct partitions recursively for each date. Finally,
build trading groups out of these partitions insuring that no pair of agents is ever in the same group.
Notice that the matching scheme in [21] does not satisfy (1). The same applies to [13], because the entire
population regularly meets in the centralized market. See [3] for more details.
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Those who are not idle either wish to consume or are able to produce, states that are
assumed to be equally likely and mutually exclusive. Hence, on odd dates each agent
faces idiosyncratic consumption risk, but patient agents are more active traders. On even
dates everyone can produce and consume. Thus, while only ραH + (1 − ρ)αL of the
population trades on odd dates, everyone trades on even dates and there is always an
equal number of buyers and sellers in each market.
On each date, a single perishable good can be produced. Sellers can supply any positive
amount of labor and can access a technology that transforms each unit of labor into one
unit of consumption goods. As in [13], it is assumed that preferences on even dates are
quasilinear U(qj)−xj for every agent type j. The first term denotes the utility from qj ≥ 0
consumption and the second term is disutility from supplying xj ≥ 0 labor. Odd date
preferences are as follows. A consumer of any type j derives utility u(cj) from consuming
cj ≥ 0 of someone else’s production. A producer of any type j suffers yj disutility from
supplying yj ≥ 0 labor to produce yj goods. The functions u and U satisfy the standard
Inada conditions and u (0) = U (0) = 0. Also, let c∗ be the solution to u(c∗) = 1 and let
q∗ be the solution to U (q∗) = 1.
As is standard in monetary models, we assume limited enforcement and limited com-
mitment. This simply means that agents have exclusive rights to their assets and endow-
ments, and their actions cannot be subject to retribution, so that trading plans must be
compatible with individual incentives. This together with the market frictions assumed
above implies an essential role for money (see [8], [11]) since on odd dates trade is quid pro
quo but consumers cannot produce. Thus, a consumption shock on odd dates corresponds
to a need for currency.
2.3 Assets and policy tools
We assume a government exists that is the sole supplier of fiat currency, of which there
is an initial stock M¯ > 0. We let the money stock evolve deterministically at gross rate
π by means of lump-sum cash transfers at the beginning of even dates. The government
also buys and sells nominal pure-discount bonds having two distinctive features similar to
U.S. Savings Bonds. First, they are non-marketable claims to currency redeemable only
by their owner.4 To formalize it, we assume bonds are intangible and non-transferable,
ownership of which is recorded by the government. The government knows neither identity,
nor type, nor trading history of agents and can credibly commit to repayment since it can
4U.S. Savings Bonds can be traded only by issuing and paying agents authorized by the U.S. Treasury.
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print currency.5
Second, bonds are illiquid in that early redemption may come at a cost and cannot
involve fractions of the asset. As we will see later, this insures agents do not make a
speculative use of bonds and use them to self-insure against consumption risk. Specifically,
bonds are issued at the end of even dates at price pA ≤ 1 and mature the following cycle
at the beginning of even dates paying off one unit of money. Unmatured bonds can be
redeemed for p ≤ 1 money by traders at the beginning of odd dates after individual
shocks have been realized. Hence, p naturally captures the notion of illiquidity as the
cost of immediate execution of a trade: 1− p is lost to convert a bond into cash at the
start of a trading cycle.
3 Efficient allocations
We start by discussing the allocation selected by a benevolent planner who maximizes
the agents’ lifetime utilities treating agents identically. Because the physical environment
displays a set of obstacles to economic interactions, two cases arise that differ in the
constraints faced by the planner.
In the first case, the planner is unconstrained by the physical and informational limi-
tations assumed to be in existence. In particular, this means that the planner can observe
types and identities and commit to and enforce a consumption plan on the initial date. The
solution to this unconstrained planning problem delivers the ‘first-best’ allocation and,
because agents differ in their discount factors, implies non-stationary type-specific con-
sumption paths. Indeed, impatient agents front-load consumption, while patient agents
do the opposite (for a discussion, see [9]). It is obvious that such an allocation cannot be
decentralized, as the frictions assumed prevent borrowing and lending.
In the second case, the planner is subject to the same physical and informational con-
straints faced by the agents and therefore can observe neither types nor identities. So,
the planner can just propose a type-independent consumption plan in each trading cycle
5The government is an inanimate entity that interacts with agents in each date. Its role is to issue
and redeem bonds and to implement lump-sum monetary transfers. This typical abstraction is used to
introduce policy in monetary models with spatial separation (e.g., [21] or [12]), random matching and
divisible money (e.g., [13], [17], [18]) as well as other models (e.g., [5], [10]). Note that we do not assume
special powers for the government as it does not need to know agents’ identities to sell and redeem bonds.
Agents can select an arbitrary ID to buy bonds and use it to redeem them. The government’s record-
keeping technology can be as simple as making the agent sign his arbitrary ID on the money spent to buy
the bond. Signatures are compared at redemption and then erased. This destroys all records and ensures
the payoff can be claimed only by the agent who purchased the bond.
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without having the ability to transfer resources across agents over time. Equivalently,
the planner maximizes expected utility of the arbitrary agent on each date. The solu-
tion to such a sequence of static problems is called a constrained-efficient allocation. It
corresponds to the outcome arising in each market if traders can coordinate and commit
to a plan ex-ante, before realizing their individual shocks. Since agents have identical
preferences ex-ante, then the constrained-efficient allocation maximizes trade surplus in
each market. Precisely, since the marginal rate of transformation of labor into consump-
tion is one, then marginal consumption utility must simply equal marginal production
disutility in each market, i.e., on odd dates u(cH) = u(cL) = 1 and on even dates
U (qH) = U (qL) = 1. Thus, the constrained-efficient consumption is stationary across
trading cycles and is defined uniquely by cj = c∗ and qj = q∗ for each type j = H,L
(details in the Appendix). This allocation is the relevant benchmark for our purposes,
and we simply call it efficient, when no confusion arises. Indeed, a sensible notion of
efficiency must take into account existing physical and informational limitations.
4 Stationary monetary allocations
Now, we investigate if the constrained-efficient allocation can be decentralized by means
of monetary exchange on competitive markets. Thus, we focus on stationary monetary
outcomes such that consumption is unaffected by the trading cycle and nominal prices
evolve so that the money stock has constant real value.6
Due to stationarity, we simplify notation omitting t subscripts and use a prime su-
perscript to identify next-cycle variables, when necessary. Accordingly, we let p1 and p2
denote the nominal price of goods on odd and even dates of an arbitrary trading cycle
t. In addition, we find it convenient to work with real variables normalizing all nominal
variables by p2, so that market one trades occur at real price p =
p1
p2
. In this manner, the
timing of events during cycle t for an agent of type j can be discussed as follows.
The arbitrary agent of type j enters cycle t with portfolio ωj = (mj , aj) listing real
holdings of money mj ≥ 0 and bonds aj ≥ 0, carried over from the preceding cycle. Then,
the idiosyncratic trading shock is realized and the agent can choose to liquidate bonds.
Subsequently, trade occurs and after market one closes the agent enters market two on
the even date with portfolio ωj,k = (mj,k, aj,k) where k = n, s, b denotes the trading shock
6Any monetary outcome that is non-stationary must be constrained inefficient. Indeed, suppose it is
not. Then, someone should be able to consume more or work less, on some date, without affecting anyone.
But this is impossible since the constrained-efficient allocation satisfies aggregate feasibility constraints
with equality. Thus, every non-stationary monetary allocation must be constrained inefficient.
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experienced in market one. Here, n identifies an agent who was idle, while b and s identify
a buyer and a seller, respectively.
To clarify how portfolios ωj,k evolve, notice that aj,k ∈ {0, aj} since by assumption
early liquidation must involve the entire stock of bonds, where aj,k = 0 corresponds to
liquidation. We work under the conjecture that early liquidation occurs only if cash is
needed to buy consumption, i.e., aj,s = aj,n = aj (the proof is provided later). Thus, if we
let cj denote consumption and yj production of type j on an odd date, money holdings
evolve within the cycle as follows:
mj,b = mj + p(aj − aj,b)− pcj
mj,s = mj + pyj
mj,n = mj .
(2)
That is, buyers deplete balances by pcj while sellers increase them by pyj . Cash left over
is used to trade in market two, when the real price is one, qj is consumption bought and
xj,k is production sold by an agent who experienced shock k (the notation qj is without
loss in generality, as we later show). In market two, agents also choose their savings. Let
mj ≥ 0 and aj ≥ 0 denote the real values of the agent’s money and bond holdings at the
start of next trading cycle (multiply by p2 or
p2
p2
to get the current nominal or real values).
In a stationary economy real asset holdings must be constant, i.e., (mj , a

j) = (mj , aj).
If M is cash at the start of a cycle and M  = πM is cash available in market two, then
p2
p2
=
M 
M
= π, (3)
i.e., in a stationary economy aggregate real balances are constant so the inflation rate
equals the rate of growth of money. This rate is controlled by means of per capita lump-
sum transfers τ in market two, so the government budget constraint is
τ + ρaH + (1− ρ)aL = (1− p)[ραH(aH−aH,b)2 + (1− ρ)
αL(aL−aL,b)
2 ]
+pAπ[ρaH + (1− ρ)aL] + [ρmH + (1− ρ)mL](π − 1).
(4)
The left hand side collects outflows of real balances due to transfers and bonds’ redemp-
tion. The right hand side accounts for inflows due to early redemption fees and bond sales
(spend pAπ today to have one real bond in the next trading cycle).
Stationarity also implies that in each trading cycle
Mπ
p2
= τ + ρ[mH + aH − αH2 (1− p)(aH − aH,b)]
+(1− ρ)[mL + aL − αL2 (1− p)(aL − aL,b)],
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i.e., real balances available in market two must equal transfers τ , plus initial money
holdings mj , plus net money inflows from redemption of bonds aj − αj2 (1− p)(aj − aj,b).
4.1 Even dates
Given the recursive nature of the problem, we use a dynamic programming approach to
describe the problem faced by the representative agent of type j at any date. We let
Vj(ωj) be the expected lifetime utility of this agent when he starts the trading cycle with
ωj , before trading shocks are realized. We also letWj(ωj,k) be the expected lifetime utility
from entering an even date with ωj,k.7
The agent’s problem at the start of an even date is:
Wj(ωj,k) = max
qj ,xj,k,ωj≥0
[U(qj)− xj,k + βjVj(ωj)]
s.t. xj,k = qj + π(mj + pAa

j)− (mj,k + aj,k + τ)
(5)
The resources available to the agent in market two partly depend on the realization
of the trading shock k, as he has mj,k real balances carried over from market one and
aj,k receipts from matured bonds. Other resources are xj,k receipts from current sales
of goods and the lump-sum real balances transfer τ .8 These resources can be used to
finance current consumption qj , to buy πaj bonds at price pA, or simply to carry πm

j
real money balances into tomorrow’s markets (short-selling is not allowed). The factor
π = p

2
p2
multiplies aj and m

j because the budget constraint lists current real values.
Notice that the composition of savings depends on expected rates of return on cash
and bonds since agents can save only with money or bonds and cannot lend to each other.
In particular, the most patient cannot lend to the less patient because the structure of
the environment severs all future direct and indirect links among current trade partners.
Substituting xj,k from the real resource constraint, (5) is rearranged as:
Wj(ωj,k) = max
qj ,ωj≥0
{U(qj)− qj − π(mj + pAaj) +mj,k + aj,k + τ + βjVj(ωj)} (6)
It follows that in a stationary monetary economy
∂Wj(ωj,k)
∂mj,k
=
∂Wj(ωj,k)
∂aj,k
= 1 for j = H,L. (7)
The result hinges on the linearity of production disutility and the use of competitive
pricing, linear in the quantity sold. It follows that the marginal value of any asset must
7 It can be proved that these value functions exist and are unique using Banach’s fixed point theorem.
8Notice that xj,k ≥ 0 so we must verify that this is true for all k in equilibrium.
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simply reflect the price of real balances, which is one. The economic implication is the
marginal valuations of real balances and bonds in market two are identical and do not
hinge on the agent’s type j, wealth ωj,k or trade shock k.
The model allows us to disentangle the agents’ portfolio choices from their trading
histories since
Wj(ωj,k) = Wj(0) +mj,k + aj,k, (8)
i.e., the agent’s expected value from having portfolio ωj,k at the start of an even date is
the expected value from having no wealth Wj(0), letting ωj = (0, 0) ≡ 0, plus the current
real value of wealthmj,k+aj,k. This implies agents of identical type exit an even date with
identical portfolios ωj , independent of their trading histories, much as in [13]. However,
different types might choose different portfolios, as we demonstrate next.
Start by observing that by (6) we have
qj = q
∗ for j = H,L. (9)
That is, everyone consumes the same amount q∗ independent of his asset holdings. The
reason is agents in market two can produce any amount at constant marginal cost. Thus
goods market clearing on even dates requires
q∗ = (1− ρ)[αL2 (xL,s + xL,b) + (1− αL)xL,n]
+ρ[αH2 (xH,s + xH,b) + (1− αH)xH,n].
(10)
Given (9) we write
Wj(ωj,k) = U(q∗)− q∗ +mj,k + aj,k + τ+ max
ωj≥0
[−π(mj + pAaj) + βjVj(ωj)].
The central implication is the agents’ lifetime utility and the efficiency of the decentralized
monetary solution will hinge on the trades that take place in market one. Since these
depend on the availability and the liquidity of financial resources, then we expect that
efficiency will impinge on the agents’ portfolio decisions ωj . This is studied next.
Let λaj ≥ 0 and λmj ≥ 0 denote the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers on the non-negativity
constraint on bonds and money holdings. The first order conditions from the optimal
portfolio choice are
π = βj
∂Vj(ωj)
∂mj
+ λmj
pAπ = βj
∂Vj(ωj)
∂aj
+ λaj
⇒
⇒
1 ≥ βjπ ×
∂Vj(ωj)
∂mj
pA ≥
βj
π ×
∂Vj(ωj)
∂aj
(= if mj > 0)
(= if aj > 0).
(11)
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Recalling that one unit of real balances buys one unit of consumption, the left hand sides
of the expressions simply define the marginal cost of assets. The right hand sides define
the expected marginal benefit from holding the asset, either money or bonds, discounted
according to time preferences and inflation. The weak inequalities reflect the optimality
requirement that the expected benefit from buying an asset cannot surpass its current
cost. It is important to realize that the benefit from holding an asset in this model hinges
not only on the asset’s yield but also on its illiquidity, i.e., the loss from converting it into
immediate cash. Indeed, since agents differ in their frequency of consumption shocks, it
follows that the expected benefit of holding any asset will generally differ across types j.
To see how, we must study trades on odd dates.
4.2 Odd dates
The problem faced by an arbitrary agent of type j who starts a trading cycle with ωj is:
Vj(ωj) =
αj
2 maxcj ,aj,b
[u(cj) +Wj(ωj,b)] +
αj
2 maxyj ,aj,s
[Wj(ωj,s)− yj ]
+(1− αj) max
aj,n
Wj(ωj,n)
s.t. pcj ≤ mj + p(aj − aj,b) and aj,k ∈ {0, aj}
(12)
The agent maximizes his expected lifetime utility by choosing consumption cj ≥ 0 as
a buyer and production yj ≥ 0 as a seller. Agents can also choose to liquidate their bonds
early by solving a discrete choice problem. Note that such a choice is relevant only for
buyers becauseWj(ωj,k)|aj,k=0 ≤Wj(ωj,k)|aj,k=aj for all k since p ≤ 1 (see (8)). It follows
that it is optimal to set:
aj,s = aj,n = aj (13)
From (12) we see that consumption cj hinges on the available cash mj , the liquidation
value paj of bonds, and the relative price p. We start by discussing the latter. To do so,
consider a seller’s problem:
max[
yj
Wj(ωj,s)− yj ]
Given (2), (8), and (13), the seller’s problem is linear in yj since
Wj(ωj,s) =Wj(0) +mj + pyj + aj .
Hence, the optimal choice yj is a correspondence. Precisely, positive and finite work effort
can arise only if prices in market one and two are identical, i.e.,
p = 1. (14)
11
The reason is that sellers have unit marginal disutility from production in any market.
Income raised in market one at price p1 can be spent in market two at price p2. Thus,
market one sellers work infinite amounts if p1p2 > 1, or not at all if
p1
p2
< 1. When p = 1
sellers are indifferent to supplying any amount. Thus, in a stationary monetary economy
(14) must hold in which case, without loss in generality, we work under the conjecture that
sellers serve an equal share of aggregate demand. Goods market clearing then implies:
yj = y =
ραHcH+(1−ρ)αLcL
ραH+(1−ρ)αL for j = H,L (15)
Now we determine cj . Given some choice aj,b, a buyer’s problem is:
max
cj≥0
u(cj) +Wj(ωj,b)
s.t. cj ≤ mj + p(aj − aj,b)
Let λj ≥ 0 be the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier on the resource constraint. Since u(0) =∞ we
have cj > 0. Recall from (2) that mj,b depends on cj . Hence, the first-order condition is
u(cj) +
∂Wj(ωj,b)
∂mj,b
∂mj,b
∂cj
− λj = 0.
Using (7), ∂mj,b∂cj = −p from (2), and (14), we have u
(cj) = 1 + λj .
If λj = 0, then cj = c∗ since u(cj) = 1. Otherwise, cj < c∗. Thus we have:
cj = min(mj + p(aj − aj,b), c∗) (16)
If we definem∗ = c∗, then liquidating bonds before maturity makes sense only ifmj < m∗.
Hence, we say that a buyer of type j is cash constrained if mj+p(aj−aj,b) < m∗. As for
the liquidation choice, in what follows we focus on outcomes where aj,b = 0 is optimal. To
better understand when early liquidation is optimal for a buyer, we need to study savings
decisions.
4.3 Savings decisions
To find the optimal portfolio of an agent we must calculate the expected marginal values
of each asset, ∂Vj(ωj)∂mj and
∂Vj(ωj)
∂aj
. To do so, use (2) and (8) in Vj(ωj). Given a liquidation
choice aj,b ∈ {0, aj}, we have
Vj(ωj) = mj + aj +
αj
2 [u(cj)− cj − (aj − aj,b)(1− p)] +Wj(0), (17)
where cj satisfies (16) and mj satisfies (2).
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Expression (17) tells us that the expected lifetime utility at the start of an arbitrary
trading cycle depends on the agent’s real wealth mj + aj and two additional elements.
First, the expected utility from trade in market one. With probability αj2 the agent spends
cj of his wealth on consumption and gets net utility u(cj)−cj . If a buyer liquidates bonds,
we have aj,b = 0 and must account for the capital loss aj(1 − p). Second, there is the
continuation payoff Wj(0). Hence, we have
∂Vj(ωj)
∂mj
= 1 +
αj
2 [u
(cj)− 1] ∂cj∂mj ,
where ∂cj∂mj = 1 if the agent is cash constrained and zero otherwise, from (16). It follows
that:
∂Vj(ωj)
∂mj
=
+
1 +
αj
2 [u
(cj)− 1] if mj + p(aj − aj,b) < m∗
1 otherwise.
(18)
Furthermore,
∂Vj(ωj)
∂aj
= 1 +
αj
2 [u
(cj)− 1] ∂cj∂aj −
αj
2 (1− p)(1−
∂aj,b
∂aj
),
so the bond’s marginal value depends on its intended use. If the agent uses bonds to
finance market one consumption, then ∂cj∂aj = p(1 −
∂aj,b
∂aj
)˙,
∂aj,b
∂aj
= 0 and ∂cj∂aj = p.
Instead, if bonds are never liquidated, i.e., aj,b = aj , then we have
∂aj,b
∂aj
= 1 and ∂cj∂aj = 0.
It follows that:
∂Vj(ωj)
∂aj
=
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1 +
αj
2 [pu
(cj)− 1] if aj,b = 0 and mj + paj < m∗
1 +
αj
2 (p − 1) if aj,b = 0 and mj + paj ≥ m∗
1 if aj,b = aj
(19)
The bond’s marginal value always reflects the price of real balances, which is equal to
one. If bonds are liquidated to finance consumption (first line) this value is adjusted by
αj
2 [pu
(cj) − 1], i.e., the expected value from having p additional cash ready to spend.
This term is likely to be positive when cash constraints are severe since there is a large
marginal benefit from buying extra consumption. Of course, if the agent is not cash
constrained (second line), the early cashing of bonds generates a capital loss 1 − p and
no benefit. This loss is absent if bonds are not liquidated (third line).
The central observation is that illiquid bonds are valued dissimilarly in the economy.
Indeed, the heterogeneity in consumption risk, governed by αj , induces heterogeneity in
expected rates of return. To see why, observe that the gross nominal yield for money is
equal to one and for bonds is
1 + i =
1
pA
.
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Now, consider nominal rates of return. The return on money is always the yield but
the return on illiquid bonds is the yield only if they are held until maturity. Indeed,
early redemption implies a capital loss and so the expected nominal rate of return is type
dependent, as for a type j we have
1
pA
[1− αj
2
(1− p)].
In short, 1−p acts as a proportional tax on liquidation and so it affects expected returns
dissimilarly across agents who have unequal consumption frequencies.
Of course, if assets finance consumption in market one we must also account for mar-
ginal consumption utility. Using (3), (11) and (18)-(19), the agents’ optimal portfolio
choices must satisfy:
1 ≥ βjπ

1 +
αj
2 [u
(cj)− 1]

(= if mj > 0)
1 ≥ βjπpA

1 +
αj
2 [pu
(cj)− 1]

(= if aj > 0 and aj,b = 0)
1 ≥ βjπpA (= if aj > 0 and aj,b = aj)
(20)
i.e., the marginal cost must be no less than the discounted expected marginal benefit.
The expressions in (20) indicate that the composition of portfolios depends on the real
interest rate and on the bonds’ illiquidity. For instance, bonds are not superior to money
if i = 0. What is crucial, however, is that the policy parameters i and π affect everyone’s
returns identically, but the bonds’ illiquidity does not. To see why this is the case, we
look in detail at the different expressions in (20).
The first line refers to the choice of real balances, the second and the third lines
refer to the choice of bonds under early liquidation or not. The first line tells us that in
choosing real balances the agent evaluates three components. The first and the second
are standard: the discount factor βj and the real yield on cash
1
π . The third component,
which is non-standard, is αj2 [u
(cj) − 1], a non-negative value since u(cj) ≥ 1 from (16).
This can be interpreted as the expected liquidity premium from having cash available in
market one and it arises because money is needed to trade in that market. This premium
grows with the severity of the cash constraint and the likelihood of a consumption shock.
A similar interpretation applies to the choice of bonds, with two key differences. First,
bonds have a possibly higher real yield 1πpA . Second, if illiquid bonds are used to buy
consumption (second line) they have a smaller liquidity premium αj2 [pu
(cj)− 1] relative
to cash. Agents consider this trade-off between bonds’ illiquidity and superior return in
choosing their portfolios. The third line in (20) instead must be considered when buyers
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hold bonds until maturity, which is relevant only ifmj > 0. Indeed, ifmj = 0, then setting
aj,b = aj violates the first line in (20) because cj = 0 implies u(0) = ∞. In any event,
in what follows we concentrate on outcomes where aj,b = 0, which can be optimal only if
the agent is cash constrained.9
To conclude this section, we discuss money market clearing in a stationary outcome.
Note that, unlike some models of money, our agents are not forced to insure against
consumption shocks solely with money as they can also use bonds. Indeed, (5) indicates
that real savings of type j are π(mj + pAa

j) with (m

j , a

j) = (mj , aj) in a stationary
outcome. Thus, the money market clears if at the end of each trading cycle aggregate real
savings equal the real money stock Mπp2 , i.e.,
Mπ
p2
= ρπ(mH + pAaH) + (1− ρ)π(mL + pAaL). (21)
We can now provide a definition of equilibrium.
Definition 1 Given an initial money stock M¯ > 0 and a government policy as specified
by (π, τ , pA, p), a competitive stationary monetary equilibrium is a constant list of real
quantities (cj , yj , qj , xj,k,mj , aj , aj,k) and cycle-dependent prices (p1,t, p2,t) that solve the
agents’ problems (5) and (12), satisfy (14), the government budget constraint (4) and
market clearing (10), (15), (21).
Summing up, policy shapes economic outcomes in our model by affecting the expected
returns of the different assets, which in turn influence agents’ portfolio choices. These
choices determine the cash available to each agent type in market one. Ultimately, this
affects the agent’s ability to consume and therefore the efficiency of the allocation.
5 The failure of the Friedman rule
A natural question, at this point, is whether the constrained optimum can be achieved
simply by eliminating the opportunity cost of holding money. Indeed, as noted in the
introduction, a common result in monetary theory is that setting i = 0, known as the
9 If mj > 0, use (17) to note that a constrained buyer’s liquidation problem is maxaj,b∈{0,aj}[u(cj) −
cj − (aj − aj,b)(1− p)]. Thus, aj,b = 0 is optimal if u(mj + paj)− u(mj) > aj . It should be now clear
why not permitting liquidation of fractions of bond holdings is important to achieve efficiency. If buyers
can liquidate a fraction θ of bonds then in the problem above aj,b = (1 − θ)aj and so θ < 1 is optimal.
Intuitively, keeping some bonds and buying slightly below c∗ generates a loss in consumption utility that
is smaller than the gain from avoiding liquidation fees, u(c∗) ≤ 1
pc
. Prohibiting partial liquidation implies
that in the optimum bonds are held to insure against consumption risk and not for speculative purposes.
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Friedman rule, allows to achieve efficiency. To answer this question we move in steps and
start by determining the highest return on money that is consistent with equilibrium.
Lemma 2 In any stationary monetary equilibrium we must have π ≥ βH .
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose a monetary equilibrium exists with π < βH .
Consider j = H in the first line of (20). We need π ≥ βH+βH αH2 [u (cH)−1] ≥ βH . This
is in contradiction with π < βH .
The lesson here is that the rate of return on money 1π cannot be excessive in a stationary
monetary equilibrium. Precisely, the upper bound for the return on money corresponds
to the lowest pure rate of time preference 1βH , i.e., the shadow interest rate. Intuitively,
if 1π >
1
βH
then cash pays such a good return that a patient agent would want to keep
accumulating money, which cannot be a stationary equilibrium.10
The implication is policy makers are constrained in their ability to give cash a return
that is sufficiently attractive for everyone. Thus, inefficiencies are to be expected when
saving can only take the form of cash. To formalize this intuition we remove the incentives
to save with bonds by setting i = 0, running the Friedman rule.11 Thus, we now ask the
question: is there any π ≥ βH that sustains the constrained-efficient allocation when
i = 0?
Lemma 3 Consider i = 0 and π > βH . A unique stationary monetary equilibrium exists
and money holdings are heterogeneous, 0 < mL < mH < m∗. As π → βH we have
cH → c∗ but cL < c∗. The allocation is inefficient for all π ≥ βH .
Proof. Let pA = 1 so i = 0. From (20) we get:
π ≥ βj

1 +
αj
2 [u
(cj)− 1]

(= if mj > 0)
π ≥ βj

1 +
αj
2 [u
(cj)p − 1]

(= if aj > 0 and aj,b = 0)
(22)
Bonds and money are equivalent assets only if p = 1, and bonds are inferior otherwise.
Thus, suppose p = 1 and simply consider money.
10This is in line with the finding in [4] where heterogeneous agents trade a fixed stock of capital, but
there is no money. There, too, the steady-state equilibrium rate of return on capital cannot exceed the
lowest rate of time preference.
11 In a representative agent model setting i = 0 requires a deflation equal to the real interest rate, i.e.
the unique discount factor. In our model we have more than one discount factor, but we have established
that π cannot fall below βH .
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Note that π ≥ βH is necessary from Lemma 2. From (22), if mH > 0 then
π = βH

1 + αH2 [u
 (cH)− 1]

.
If π > βH then cH < c
∗ and mH < m∗. As π →+ βH then cH → c∗ and mH → m∗.
Thus, suppose π = βH . Now, mL > 0 implies
π = βL

1 + αL2 [u
 (cL)− 1]

= βH .
Since βL < βH , it follows that cL < c
∗ and mL < m∗. Hence, if i = 0 then a unique
stationary monetary equilibrium exists in which 0 < mL < mH < m∗ and 0 < cL <
cH < c
∗. In equilibrium limπ→+βH mH = m
∗, so limπ→+βH cH = c
∗; also, ∂cL∂π < 0. Thus,
the Friedman rule cannot achieve the efficient allocation. Existence easily follows from
inspection of the individual optimality and market clearing conditions.
What is the intuition? When i = 0 effectively we have a model where agents insure
against consumption shocks only with money. Due to discounting disparities, equilibrium
returns must obey the optimality condition π ≥ βH , so the more impatient tend to under-
insure. This leaves them cash constrained in market one, which creates an inefficiency. Of
course, letting π → βH allows the more patient agents to perfectly insure, sincemH → m∗
and cH → c∗.
This result seems quite robust. The Friedman rule should fail to sustain perfect
consumption insurance when money has an explicit transactions role and agents price
future consumption unequally. In fact, lowering the return on bonds to that of money by
setting i = 0 seems to be the source of the problem. It eliminates the opportunity cost
of holding money, which is good, but it fails to provide adequate incentives for everyone
to save enough, which is bad, since π ≥ βH > βL. Thus, we next consider a policy where
i > 0. Before doing so, several remarks are in order.
First, we emphasize that the Friedman rule does not fail to sustain the constrained-
efficient allocation just because bonds are illiquid. Setting p = 1 and i = 0 simply makes
money and bonds indistinguishable financial instruments. Second, the result does not
hinge on the mere existence of some arbitrary heterogeneity element that gives different
agents incentives to hold unequal money balances. In fact, the Friedman rule can be quite
effective in eliminating equilibrium heterogeneity in real balances when agents differ in
aspects other than time preferences.
To see why, consider for example an economy in which βH = βL = β. However, retain
the assumption of disparities in trade shocks, αH > αL. Now, set i = 0 so from Lemma
17
3 a unique monetary equilibrium exists for π > β. Specifically, we have
π = β

1 + αH2 [u
 (cH)− 1]

= β

1 + αL2 [u
 (cL)− 1]

.
Here, balances and consumption are heterogeneous, cL < cH < c∗ and mL < mH < m∗.
Types L under-insure as they do not need cash as frequently as types H. The opposite
occurs if αH < αL. However, as π →+ β all real balances converge to m∗ because
agents become indifferent between having a dollar today or one tomorrow.12 In this case,
trade-frequency considerations do not enter saving decisions (see also [6]).
6 Using bonds to finance consumption
We now want to demonstrate that the efficient allocation can be sustained when the
bonds’ yield is positive. To simplify our task, we start by proving that such an allocation
is inconsistent with agents holding money in their portfolios.
Lemma 4 Consider a stationary monetary equilibrium in which i > 0. If mj > 0 and
aj > 0, then cj < c∗.
Proof. Let pA < 1 so i > 0. We want to show that an agent who holds bonds and
money in equilibrium must be cash constrained, i.e., cj < c∗. By means of contradiction,
suppose mj > 0 and aj > 0 but cj = c∗. There are two cases to consider: mj ≥ m∗ and
0 < mj < m
∗.
Suppose mj ≥ m∗. Here bonds are not liquidated since the agent is not cash con-
strained. From (20), we have π = βj , since mj > 0. This implies π <
βj
pA
. But this is
inconsistent with equilibrium (see the third line in (20)).
Now suppose mj ∈ (0,m∗). Using (20) and our hypothesis cj = c∗, we must have the
following in equilibrium:
π
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
= βj
≥ βjpA

1− αj2 (1− p

≥ βjpA
(23)
The first line in (23) follows from mj > 0. We readily derive a contradiction since
π = βj <
βj
pA
(24)
12For π = β a continuum of monetary equilibria exists. The reason is price indeterminacy, as any
sequence of nominal prices which is consistent with π = β is a monetary equilibrium.
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whenever i > 0. This violates the third line in (23). The reason is that, given the return
on money 1βj , the agent would prefer to shift some money into bonds. That is, the agent
would definitely prefer to consume slightly less than c∗ in market one and hold some bonds
until maturity. The trade-off is favorable since the bonds’ yield is greater than one (that
of money), while decreasing consumption marginally in market one has a small (second
order) effect as the marginal utility is one at c∗. We conclude that if mj > 0 and aj > 0
in a stationary monetary equilibrium with i > 0, then cj < c∗. This is true independent
of whether bonds are held until maturity or not.
When the yield on bonds is positive, agents who hold both money and bonds must be
cash constrained. Again, this is an arbitrage argument. In fact, suppose the agent is not
cash constrained in market one but is holding both money and bonds. Then, since bonds
pay positive interest, the agent could achieve the same consumption level and accumulate
wealth by holding more bonds.
This result suggests that perhaps the optimal policy should encourage agents to save
only with bonds and not with money. The government could make cash an unattractive
asset for saving purposes by selecting a sufficiently high π. Then, agents would possibly
fully insure against consumption shocks using bonds and liquidate them when needed. In
the words of Tobin, “Why not hold transactions balances in assets with higher yields than
cash, shifting into cash only at the time an outlay must be made?” ([19], p. 241).
The problem is this might induce the most patient agents to buy infinite amounts of
bonds. To see why, consider for a moment an economy in which i > 0 and agents save
only with bonds. Suppose also that cj = c∗. Then, from (20) we have that mj = 0 for all
j if π > βH and aj > aj,b = 0 if:
π = 1pAβj

1− αj2 (1− p)

As p → 1 we have that if π = 1pAβL > βH then π <
1
pA
βH . That is, the patient
agents would want to buy infinite amounts of bonds, which is not an equilibrium. Our
next objective is to prove that, in certain economies, such arbitrage opportunities can be
avoided in a simple way: by making bonds sufficiently illiquid.
6.1 The optimal illiquidity of bonds
We start by presenting a condition that we need in proving that the constrained-efficient
allocation can be sustained as an equilibrium:
βL
βH
>
2− αH
2− αL
(25)
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Since αH > αL then
2−αH
2−αL < 1. Thus (25) simply limits the extent of disparities in
individual discount factors. We now proceed to demonstrate that, under this condition,
the efficient allocation can be achieved if bonds are sufficiently illiquid.
We start by reminding the reader that in such an allocation every buyer consumes c∗ in
market one, q∗ in market two, and agents save only with bonds. Precisely, everyone enters
market one with real portfolio (m,a) = (0, a∗), where a∗ = c
∗
p
. Then, buyers liquidate all
of their bonds to purchase c∗ goods, sellers produce y = c∗ goods earning m∗ = c∗ real
balances, and the inactive agents do nothing. Thus, at the start of market two buyers
have neither cash nor bonds, whereas idle agents and sellers have, respectively, a∗ and
m∗+ a∗ real balances available (as bonds mature). In market two, everyone consumes q∗,
receives the real balance transfer τ and purchases πa∗ bonds at price pA. To accomplish
this, agents who bought in market one produce xb = q∗+ pAπa∗− τ , those idle in market
one produce xn = xb− a∗, while market one sellers now produce xs = xb− (m∗+ a∗) ≥ 0.
Proposition 5 Consider economies in which (25) is satisfied. If
π > βH
p = 1− 2(βH−βL)αHβH−αLβL
pA =
βH
π

1− αH2 (1− p)

,
(26)
then cj = c∗ for all j is a stationary monetary equilibrium. Here pA, p ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. We use a constructive proof. First we conjecture that the allocation is efficient,
and then we prove that the expressions in (26) support existence of an equilibrium in
which cj = c∗ for all j.
Conjecture cj = c∗ for some i > 0. Applying Lemma 4 we must insure that agents’
savings consist only of bonds. Thus, we need mj = 0 for all j, which requires π > βH
from (20). Thus, let π > βH . Since bonds must be liquidated to finance c
∗ consumption
we also need aj > aj,b = 0 for all j, which requires
π =
βj
pA

1− αj2 (1− p)

, (27)
from the second line in (20).
Consider j = H. Then (27) holds if
pA =
1
πβH

1− αH2 (1− p)

≡ 1πh(p), (28)
which defines uniquely pA as a function of π. Since we are assuming π > βH then pA <
1− αH2 (1− p), i.e., i > 0.
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Now consider j = L. Equation (27) holds when, using pA from (28), the following
equality is satisfied:
βH

1− αH2 (1− p)

= βL

1− αL2 (1− p)

⇒ βLβH =
2−αH(1−p)
2−αL(1−p)
This can be rewritten as
p = 1−
2(βH − βL)
αHβH − αLβL
, (29)
which gives p > 0 only if (25) holds. Thus assume (25). Since βH > βL and αH > αL,
then p < 1 and p = 1 if βH = βL. Note also that p > pA if π is large. Thus, assuming
π > βH and (25), if p satisfies (29) and pA satisfies (28) then (27) holds for all j.
We note that in this case (27) implies π <
βj
pA
, since p < 1. This does not mean that
agents would buy and hold infinite amounts of bonds without liquidating them. Indeed,
fractions of bonds cannot be liquidated by assumption. Thus, since mj = 0 buying bonds
without liquidating them is not an equilibrium, as the marginal utility of consumption in
market one would be infinite. Hence, aj = a = c∗/p for j = L,H, as indicated by (16).
Money market clearing (21) requires pAa = m¯ and stationarity a = a. Thus, from (4)
the government sets
τ = m¯π − m¯
pA
k
1− (1− p)

ρ
αH
2
+ (1− ρ)αL
2
l
,
i.e., τ equals real balances at the end of the cycle m¯π, minus the payments to bond holders
m¯
pA
net of liquidation fees m¯1−ppA

ραH2 + (1− ρ)
αL
2

. Finally, it can be proved that xj,k ≥ 0
if U (x) is sufficiently larger than u(x) for x ∈ R+ (see the Appendix).
In short, when the most patient agents are also those who are more often in need of
liquidity because of consumption shocks, then two elements are necessary to sustain the
efficient allocation: savings with bonds must be encouraged by setting i > 0 and setting
π > βH , and bonds must be illiquid, i.e., p < 1. What is the intuition? First, we know
that deflation cannot be too pronounced in a monetary equilibrium and therefore the
impatient agents under-insure by using cash. Consequently, we must give bonds a return
superior to cash by setting i > 0.
However, the patient agents would demand infinite quantities of bonds if they were
fully liquid. Thus, we need to lower the expected return on bonds for these agents. As
long as types H need cash more frequently than agents L, this can be done by making the
bonds illiquid setting p < 1. When (25) holds, a unique p ∈ (0, 1) exists that equates
the present values of returns across agent types:
βH
k
1− αH
2
(1− p)
l
= βL
k
1− αL
2
(1− p)
l
.
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The necessary degree of illiquidity p falls as discounting disparities increase, which is why
heterogeneity in discounting cannot be too extreme, i.e., why (25) must hold.
Finally, once we have calculated the optimal degree of illiquidity, we back out the
nominal interest rate that sustains the efficient equilibrium by setting the bond’s price pA
equal to the deflated present value of bonds’ returns. This gives us
i = πβH
θ − 1 where θ =
αH
βH
βL
−αL
αH−αL ≥ 1.
(30)
Nominal interest rates are a function of a weighted measure θ of the agents’ discount
factors, with weights given by the frequencies of consumption shocks.
The analysis is consistent with the notion of a Fisher effect. Indeed, i fully accounts
for inflationary pressure, rising or falling, but the allocation is unaffected. So money is
superneutral when agents save only with correctly priced bonds.13 In particular, bonds
dominate cash in rate of return, which is why no one saves with cash. Bond yields also
include a liquidity premium captured by θ, since an increase in the bonds’ illiquidity
lessens their attractiveness. In environments where the efficient equilibrium is associated
to a lower p, hence a higher θ, we see that the bonds’ yield must be higher. As discounting
disparities vanish, so does the need for illiquidity and
lim
βH ,βL→β
i =
π
β
− 1,
i.e., the real yield converges to the common rate of time preference.
6.2 Other considerations
In this section we make a few more considerations on the finding emerged from Proposition
5. First, we note that the result holds in economies in which inflation can be substantial.
To build intuition consider the case βH = βL = β, so that the first best allocation satisfies
cj = c
∗ for all j. This outcome can be sustained in two manners. A first possibility is to
induce agents to save with cash that guarantees the return 1β . This is achieved by lowering
the yield on bonds to that of money, setting i = 0 and running a deflation at rate π = β,
since cash cannot pay interest. Here, we are at the Friedman rule and money and bonds
are perfect substitutes if p = 1.
13Superneutrality is generally taken to mean that, in long-run equilibrium, the magnitudes of real
macroeconomic variables are unaffected by the inflation rate and therefore by the rate of growth of the
money stock ([20], p. 98-99). In our model, the money growth rate π is the inflation rate in stationary
equilibrium. There are three key real variables: real interes rate, consumption, and real asset holdings.
Proposition 5 indicates that in an optimum the magnitudes of these variables are invariant to π, for
π > βH , since the nominal interest rate is fully adjusted (see (30)).
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Alternatively, if for some reason π > β must be selected, the government can sell liquid
bonds at price pA =
β
π , standing ready to redeem them costlessly. Here, agents save only
with bonds that pay real return 1β for any given π and the allocation is efficient. The
lesson is that a deflation is unnecessary for efficiency as long as some asset exists that
offers a real yield 1β and that can be easily transformed into consumption. If bonds are
illiquid, instead, the efficient allocation can be sustained when the interest rate is raised
by setting
pA =
β
π
[1− 1− p
2
max(αH ,αL)],
and agents are rationed in their purchases of bonds. This is reminiscent of the market
for U.S. Savings Bonds, the purchases of which cannot exceed a fixed nominal amount
(currently $60,000 for the EE series). We note that this same rationing strategy would
sustain an efficient allocation when βH > βL but αH ≤ αL. Thus, illiquid bonds can
be useful under different assumptions on the relationship between time discounting and
trading risk.
It is also interesting to consider what happens when the model is generalized to more
than two types. To this end, relabel L = 0 and H = 1 and consider an economy in which
the set of types is [0, 1] instead of {0, 1}. That is, we have a continuum of types j each of
which is characterized by a pair (βj ,αj) ∈ (0, 1)2. We can prove the following Corollary
to Proposition 5.
Corollary 6 Consider an economy with types j indexed by [0, 1]. There exists a family
of types (βj ,αj)j∈[0,1] on (0, 1)
2 increasing in j such that if (25) holds and government
policy satisfies (26), then cj = c∗ for all j is a stationary monetary equilibrium.
Proof. We want to show that, given {τ ,π, pA, p}, the Euler equation (27) holds for all
j ∈ [0, 1] given some (βj ,αj)j∈[0,1] ⊂ (0, 1)2. That is, for each type j we have
βj

1− αj2 (1− p)

= pAπ.
Proceed as follows. Without loss in generality, index the agent types so that a higher
j is associated to a higher discount factor βj . To do so, fix two values β0 < β1 in (0, 1)
and then express each βj as the convex combination of β0 and β1, i.e.,
βj = β0 + j(β1 − β0) for j ∈ [0, 1].
Now define the continuous function θ : [0, 1]× (0, 1)→ R with
θ(j,α) = βj
k
1− α
2
(1− p)
l
− pAπ.
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Fix two values of α, called α0,α1 ∈ (0, 1), that satisfy α0 < α1 and (25) with the obvious
relabeling. Therefore, pAπ is a constant. Now impose (26).
Note that θ(0,α0) = θ(1,α1) = 0, from Proposition 5. Also, θ(j,α1) < 0 < θ(j,α0)
for all j ∈ (0, 1), since βj monotonically increases in j. Finally, the partial derivatives
of θ are such that θα(j,α) < 0 < θj(j,α) for all j and α. Since θ is continuous, the
Intermediate Value Theorem guarantees there is a unique α = α(j) ∈ (α0,α1) ⊂ (0, 1)
such that θ(j,α) = 0. Let αj ≡ α(j), and notice that the implicit function theorem
assures that αj varies continuously with j and is increasing in j.
Therefore, we can define a continuous function f : [0, 1]→ (0, 1)2 from the set of types
to the sets of discount factors β and trading probabilities α, such that f(j) = (βj ,αj) is
monotonically increasing in j. The family (βj ,αj)j∈[0,1] satisfies (25) and supports the
efficient allocation when inflation and debt structure are as in (26).
The central finding is that, if we retain the government debt structure previously
considered, then the efficient allocation is sustainable even when we allow for a continuum
of types. Once again, the general parameter requirement is that those agents who are more
patient also face a greater probability of trading in market one.
7 Final remarks
Our study offers two basic lessons. First, heterogeneity in preferences over future con-
sumption blunts the effectiveness of the Friedman rule. Under zero interest rates, agents
essentially must rely on the available stock of fiat money as a means to insure against con-
sumption risk. A simple arbitrage argument indicates that cash cannot promise a return
greater than the discount factor of the most patient agents, much as it happens for the
return on capital in [4]. Hence, the more impatient will under-insure, which is detrimental
to efficiency. Under-insurance implies that in equilibrium agents hold different amounts
of the available stock of money. However, unlike [4], everyone holds some cash. These
findings should be obtained in any environment with similar heterogeneity, where money
is essential to execute trades.
A second lesson is that nominal interest rates should be positive in order to sustain the
constrained-efficient allocation. Under certain conditions, an additional friction is needed.
Specifically, bonds should be illiquid, i.e., they should be convertible into immediate con-
sumption less efficiently than cash. In the model, this necessity stems from differences in
discounting and consumption needs. Illiquidity is a friction that removes arbitrage op-
portunities if the individuals who have the lowest discount rate are also those who trade
24
more frequently. Although this result is less general, it suggests one more reason as to
why illiquid government bonds might be socially desirable financial instruments.
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Appendix
The constrained-efficient allocation
When the social planner is subject to the same spatial and informational frictions of
agents, the planning problem corresponds to a sequence of static maximization problems
subject to the technological constraints.
Recall that we are assuming that the planner weighs each agent identically and that the
planner cannot recognize agents’ types. On each date agents have identical preferences
ex-ante. Also, on each date there is an identical proportion of buyers and sellers, so
consumption of each buyer must correspond to production of some seller. Thus, on each
odd date the planner maximizes expected utility of an arbitrary active agent, subject to
technological feasibility. Since on odd dates agents that are active can produce or consume
with equal probability, then the planner’s problem is:
maxc,y
1
2 [u(c)− y]
s.t. c = y
On each even date the problem to be solved is similar:
maxq,x U(q)− x
s.t. q = x
Hence, the constrained-efficient allocation is stationary across trading cycles, i.e., cj =
yj = c
∗ and qj = xj = q∗ for each type j in each cycle t. Recalling that to each buyer
corresponds a seller in each market, then the constrained-efficient allocation maximizes
the trade surplus u(c)− c in market one and U(q)− q in market two.
Conditions for xj,k ≥ 0
We now want to provide conditions that guarantee xj,k ≥ 0 in the constrained-efficient
equilibrium described in Proposition 5. We know that qj = q∗ for all j. These results and
the budget constraint in (5) imply
xj,k = q
∗ + π(mj + pAa

j)− (mj,k + aj,k + τ)
In the stationary constrained-efficient equilibrium agents save only with bonds, i.e.,mj = 0
and aj = a = a for all j. Let m¯ = Mp2 denote the real stock of money at the start of each
trading cycle. Since pAa = m¯, then:
xj,k = q
∗ + m¯π − (mj,k + aj,k + τ)
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From now on we focus on the seller’s case, since xj,b > xj,s. Since p = 1, we have
mj,s = c
∗ = m¯ppA and aj,s = a =
m¯
pA
. Therefore, the constrained-efficient allocation
production in market two is type independent:
xs = q
∗ + m¯π − c∗ − m¯pA − τ
= q∗ + c
∗pAπ
p
− c∗ − c∗p − c
∗ pA
m¯p
τ
= q∗ − c∗ + c∗pAπp −
c∗pA
p
− c∗ 1−pp

ραH2 + (1− ρ)
αL
2

since
τ = πm¯− m¯pA + m¯
1−p
pA

ραH2 + (1− ρ)
αL
2

.
Therefore
xs = q
∗ − c∗[1 + 1−pp (ρ
αH
2 + (1− ρ)
αL
2 )]. (31)
Since the term multiplying c∗ is greater than one, then q∗ must be sufficiently larger
than c∗ in order to have xs > 0. In the efficient equilibrium U (q∗) = u(c∗) = 1, so that
(31) implies we need preferences that satisfy U (x) > u(x) for any x ∈ R+.
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